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Overview
• Traditional metrics of program performance have been cost, 
schedule and system requirements, relative to the APB 
baselines set at a previous point in time
– Some programs perform well, but most do not
• What is the impact of defense acquisition regulation or 
reforms?
– Previously modeled as the correlation and direction of change for 
a key performance metric for a program in the years following the 
introduction of the oversight or reform change
– Provides absolutely no insight on the actual mechanism behind 
the implied causality 
• Hypothetical: What went on (that was internal to programs) that caused cost 
growth to slow after FASA in 1994, or to show no effect from Packard 
Commission reforms in 1987 ? 
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Overview
• We take a new approach here, where a mechanism is already in 
place to create program changes   
– DAES reviews and requirements for corrective actions
• Recurring program assessment ratings
• Defined corrective steps and timeline
• Follow up occurs in the next DAES review 
• The following models will determine if regulation, oversight and 
a variety of other factors produce desired or expected results 
on the ratings process  - and drive the corrective steps that 
have to be taken by program management before the next 
review. 
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Method
• Like a report card, DAES program assessment reviews




• If regulatory and oversight actions, or cost performance, etc
support a Green rated program continuing to be Green rated, 
this is precisely the desired result.  
• On the other hand, if regulatory or oversight actions drive a 
Green rated program toward Yellow or Red, then the corrective 
mechanism comes into play and corrections must be made –
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Method
• Ordered logit models 
– Efficiently use the information contained in the ranked values of 
dependent (response) variable, i.e. Red << Yellow << Green
– Response (dependent ) variable is recoded  1,2,3, and the 
functional form assumes a logistically distributed error term
– Four models 
• Focus is on two DAES rating categories (Cost and Schedule) – from 
two points of view, Program Management and OSD
• Exploratory work also modeled binary recodes of assessment 
rating variables to understand contrasts, i.e., program was 
either green (=1) in time period j or it was not  (=0)
– Several variants on same principle
– Points the way for future work to refine our understanding of 
impact of breach run-in and breach recovery, funding instability, 
rebaselining, cancellation




Integrate program-varying data with 
time-varying data for statistical 


















Programs have been  




















2001 89.3 AF 1D 4614
2002 nr 89.3 AF 1D 4691
2003 89.3 AF 1D 4745
2004 89.3 AF 1D 4398
2005 89.3 AF 1D 4783
2006 89.3 AF 1D 4940
2007 89.3 AF 1D 4740
2008 nr 89.3 AF 1D 4700
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Data
• Time series, cross sectional panel, 2001-2013
– Program Manager (PM) assessment ratings for Cost and Schedule 
categories
– OSD DAES review team assessment ratings for Cost and Schedule 
categories
• Program Selection: 
– 57 major defense programs included in sample 
– Minimum 3, maximum 13 years.  Average 8-9 years. 
– 19 (+/-) MDAPs sampled per service 
• Regulatory data methodology followed the Krieger and Pritchard* 
method for counting acquisition regulation measures.
• Service specific manpower counts (GS1102 contracting officers).
• Program specific data from SARs, APBs. 
* John Kreiger and John Pritchard (2009) “Acquisition Reform and the Golf Ball.” Contract Management 49 (12), 18‐27. December.
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Programs   Service branch MDAP Status ACAT  Joint Capability Area Original APB Year AEHF Air Force Active ID Net Centric 2001
AGM-88E AARGM Navy Active IC Force Application 2003
AH-64E  Army Active IC Force Application 2006 
AMRAAM AIM-120   Air Force Active IC Force Application 1988 
ARH-70 Arapaho Army Cancelled ID Force Application 2005
ASDS Navy Cancelled ID Force Application 2003
ATIRCM-CMWS Army Completed IC Protection 1996
B-1B CMUP Air Force Completed ID Force Application 1996
B-2 RMP  Air Force Completed IC Force Application 2004 
C-17A  Air Force Completed IC Logistics 1988 
C-5 AMP Air Force Completed IC Logistics 2006
C-5 RERP Air Force Active IC Logistics 2001
CH-47F Army Active IC Logistics 1998
CH-53K Navy Active ID Logistics 2005
CVN-78   Navy Active ID Force Application 2004 
DDG-1000  Navy Active IC Force Application 2005 
DDG-51 Navy Active ID Force Application 1988
E-2D AHE Navy Active ID Command &Control 2003
EA-18G  Navy Active IC Force Application 2003 
EELV Air Force Active ID Force Application 2004
Excalibur  Army Active IC Force Application 2004 
F-22 Raptor Air Force Active IC Force Application 1992
F-35 JSF DOD Active ID Force Application 2001
FAB-T Air Force Active ID Net Centric 2007
FCS  Army Cancelled ID Force Application 2003 
FMTV  Army Completed IC Logistics 1988
GMLRS - GMLRS AW  Army Active IC Force Application 1998 
JASSM Air Force Active ID Force Application 2011
JDAM Air Force Active IC Force Application 1995
JLENS Army Active IC Protection 2005
JTN  Army Active ID Net Centric 2002 
JTRS AMF Army Active ID Net Centric 2008
JTRS HMS  Army Active ID Net Centric 2004 
LCS Navy Active ID Force Application 2011
LHA-6 Navy Active ID Force Application 2006
LPD-17  Navy Active IC Force Application 1996 
MH-60S  Navy Active IC Force Application 1998 
MQ-1C Grey Eagle Army Active IC Battlespace Awareness 2011
MQ-9 Reaper UAS Air Force Active IC Battlespace Awareness 2012
MUOS Navy Active ID Net Centric 2004
NAVY ERP Navy Active . Logistics 2004
NPOESS  Air Force Cancelled IC Battlespace Awareness 2002 
P-8A Poseidon  Navy Active ID Force Application 2004 
Patriot MEADS CAP Army Active ID Protection 2004
RAH-66 Comanche Army Cancelled ID Force Application 1988
RQ-4A-B Global Hawk Air Force Active ID Battlespace Awareness 2001
SBIRS-High Air Force Active ID Battlespace Awareness 1996
SDB I  Air Force Completed . Force Application 2003 
SM-6 Navy Active ID Protection 2004
SSN 774  Navy Active ID Force Application 1995 
Stryker Army Completed IC Force Application 2000
Tactical Tomahawk Navy Active IC Force Application 1999
UH-60A  Army Active IC Logistics 2002 
V-22  Navy Active IC Logistics 1988 
VTUAV Navy Active IC Battlespace Awareness 2006
WGS  Air Force Active IC Net Centric 2000 
WIN-T Army Restructured ID Net Centric 2007
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Models and Results
• Four models, described by the dependent variable we wish to 
explain
– Program Manager team Cost assessment of the program
– OSD DAES Review team Cost assessment of the program
– Program Manager team Schedule assessment of the program
– OSD DAES Review team Schedule assessment of the program
• Reading the table on the next slide:
– Negative sign on coefficient estimates indicates that an increase in 
the explanatory variable correlates with worse ratings (yellow or 
red); a positive sign predicts better ratings 
– Statistical significance is noted by asterisks – the more asterisks, 
the higher the statistical significance





Model (1) (2) (3) (4)




NDAA Sections (1Lag) + **  + **  ‐   ‐ 
GS1102 Workforce (1Lag)  ‐  ‐   ‐  ‐
GS1102 Workforce (2Lag) + *  +   +   ‐ 
GAO Report  ‐ *  ‐ ‐***  + 
DARS Notifications (1Lag)  +    .  ‐   + 
APUC Growth (Pct)  ‐ * + ‐ ‐**
Acquisition workforce,US  ‐ + +* +*
MSB to MSC (months) ‐ ** ‐
PM Cost Red (1Lag) ‐ **
PM Cost Yellow (1Lag) ‐ **
OSD Cost Red (1Lag) ‐ ***
OSD Cost Yellow (1Lag) ‐ ***
PM Sched Red (1Lag) ‐***
PM Sched Yellow (1Lag) ‐***
OSD Sched Red (1Lag) ‐***





UAV/UAS ‐ ** ‐ ‐***
Helicopter  ‐* ‐
Original APB Year ‐  ** ‐ ‐**
ACAT 1D Program ‐***
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Interpretation
• Previous period rating is a factor, as expected, but the models 
clearly tell us that there is a bigger story in ratings program 
performance
• Regulation (NDAA) as we tested it here, was significant – but 
not DARS notifications.
– Better approach would use qualitative distinctions
on type and specificity of regulation
• Oversight matters
– GAO mention of a program in “Assessments of Selected 
Weapons Programs...” 
– ACAT 1D and level of program decisional authority matters




– Clear relationship of some system types with poorly rated 
programs (vehicles, UAV/UAS) or better rated programs 
(munitions, missiles)
• Supports and validates the significance of cost growth and 
schedule slip as concerns to the assessment teams 
• Obvious independence of viewpoints not only between Cost 
and Schedule reviews, but also, between the PM team and the 
OSD team reviewers (this is a good thing)
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Conclusion
• Models suggest a better way to evaluate if process or oversight 
reform works
– There is a closed loop feedback mechanism in place, with periodic 
objective review by experienced review teams. 
– The DAES review assessment rating process holds promise for 
suggesting why a reform works – or doesn’t 
• Oversight does matter – and apparently, rather than being a 
burden, may efficiently drive program improvements 
• Econometric modeling lesson is that this is opportunity for 
better understanding of cause, effect, and explanation of 
defense acquisition improvements like Better Buying Power
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Future Direction
• Program database continues to grow after we closed the data 
set for this study
• Expanding sample allows for work on
– Program phase (EMD, Production); cancelled and restructured 
programs; Nunn-McCurdy process on program outcomes
– Frequency of rebaselining and program quality   
– Assessment ratings on Funding and System Requirements 
(“Performance”)
• Fix shortcomings on regulatory, oversight and manpower data 
we were unable to obtain
• Add program specific and period event data
• Expand on testing and insights from other modeling methods 
